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## ALLOCHSTAN ON THE NORTH SEA

*Packaging immigrants*

In the Netherlands, immigrants and their children born in the Netherlands, are packaged as *allochtons*; a combination of foreign-born immigrants and children born in the Netherlands out of foreign-born parents. So the number of *allochtons* in the Netherlands is much higher than the number of immigrants, coming from elsewhere. The *Integration Map 2006* shows that almost one out of every five inhabitants is *allochton* (19.3%). Out of a total population of 16,334,200, the *allochtons* number 3,147,700; that is first and second generation, and western and non-western combined. The *allochton* category includes Dutch citizens originating from the Dutch-Caribbean, which has for centuries been part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, and migrants from Surinam, a former Dutch colony in Latin America. A closer look reveals that *immigrants* of non-western origin, mainly from Turkey, Morocco, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles, number 6.2 % of the total population; 10 years ago this was 4.8 % (CBS, 2006, Table 2.1) (SCP, 2005, 27).

The Dutch *allochton* construction bypasses a hyphenated identity such as Black-American, Italian-American, Native-American etcetera, which provides vital information on one's origin, to be valued, at least in the US. The *allochton* character cannot be deployed to turn a prejudicial negative connotation upside down into an activist cause, as is done with *Black is Beautiful*; *Black Power*; *All Workers (or Proletarians) Unite*; *Girl Power*; *Better Death than Slavery*<sup>1</sup>; *Ploud (sic) and Poor* (a saying in Zambia, Southern Africa). All in all, the *allochton* is such an ambiguous character that he has nothing to show and to

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1 Text on monument commemorating battle Frisians against Holland in September 1345: *Leaver Dea as Sleaf* (sic), Warns, Friesland, the Netherlands.

fight for or against, for that matter. The *allochton* lacks motivation, neither being a rebel nor having a cause.

The *allochton* stands for second-rate citizens. When Martin Sitalsing, originating from Suriname, became in 2009 a regional Chief of Police in the Netherlands, the media commented that his being an *allochton* blemishes his otherwise so illustrious career.<sup>2</sup> By way of contrast, the mentally deranged Dutchman who in 2009 attempted to crash his car into the Royal Bus on the Queen's birthday, was pronounced over and over again to be an *autochthon*, suggesting a surprise on one hand ('how is that possible?'), and disappointment on the other, as mischief is generally attributed to the *allochton* section of the nation. The *autochthon* signature of the offender quelled the public authority's worries of possible *True Dutch* retaliation attacks on *allochtons*.

The *allochton* does not have a mobilizing cause such as racism (for Blacks); anti-Semitism (for Jews); Catholics and Protestants among each other; East and West; or Global Warming, Carbon Footprint, and the World's Resources Depletion. Among themselves the *allochtons* are divided, by origin, time of arrival and social-economic status. In other words, the *allochton* does not constitute any group agency other than being a non-western immigrant in the Netherlands whose descendents will eventually become Dutch citizens, which does not carry much cause to rally. So far being labelled an *allochton* has not been coined as a *nom de guerre*. Most *allochtons* are already Netherlands citizens. And outside Holland no *allochton* is found to unite with. What then is there to fight for? Or against? The *allochton* does not have a resounding cause.

Precisely this lack of identity, content and fighting power allows the Dutch to belittle and underestimate the problems that are entrenched in their relations with the *allochton*. Many believe that all along the Dutch have been a hospitable people, free from racism, prejudice or discrimination (Witte, 2010). They maintain – not altogether without reason – that the *black* school on Dutch territory is surely not part of a racist plot, which softens the urgency for reform. The constitutionally embedded *free choice education* must remain in place, even if this has lubricated the emergence of *black* schools. No regulation is required to have this changed; the Dutch believe that for the *integration* of the *allochton* to succeed, some parental goodwill and voluntary desegregation projects are all that is necessary. Yet *integration* does

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2 Anja Sligter, *Vrolijke drammer met fikse meerwaarde*. In: De Volkskrant, 7 juli 2009.

not make sense when *allochton* children find themselves in *black* schools, especially in those neighbourhoods from which *True Dutch* parents have fled when opting for a white school for their children (see Chapter 5). The *allochton* is a perfidious contraption of non-western immigrants, born out of a Dutch *live and let live* enlightenment, which eventually resulted in a segregated *Allochstan on the North Sea*, a massive distinction between *True Dutch* (*Echte Nederlander*) and non-western immigrants.

*Allochstan on the North Sea* is a catchphrase to identify the subordination of non-western immigrants and their descendents in the Netherlands, just as the *Bantustan* did since 1948 for *blacks* and *coloreds* in the years of South Africa's *apartheid* system. The *Bantustan* was rooted in an ascription of white racial superiority, which endorsed a legal and fully regulated racist statehood system of whites over blacks that survived until 1994 when the first elections with universal suffrage were held. In the Netherlands, non-western origin, Islam and cultural indicators are the designated border posts between the *True Dutch* and non-western immigrants. First and second generation immigrants are put together in *allochton* brackets, they must follow Dutch civics courses; their children go to *black* schools. Non-western immigrants have been advised to blot out their *funny* names when applying for jobs. These social codes are an expression of how the Dutch position themselves, *True Dutch* vis-à-vis an inflated non-western population of *allochtons*.

*Allochstan* is not set up in formally regulated statehood but has gradually evolved into being a Dutch 'province' made up of words, statistics, popular beliefs and attitudes, and continuously referred to in media and politics. It is an imagined reality which, '[...] as Benedict Anderson would insist, doesn't mean unreal: nothing could be more powerful than the human imagination' (Appiah, 2005, 242). The words picked to describe this imagination are revealing of one's intention (Jude, 2010, 171).

The genesis of *Allochstan* is – according to received opinion – the immigrant himself; had he not immigrated there would have been no *Allochstan* today. However, the *allochton* is created by Dutch regulation and practice, ranking the non-western immigrant population on all sorts of scales. The combinations of these rankings have provided the matrix for *Allochstan on the North Sea*. The time is long gone that the *allochton* was just a statistical figure or administrative category.<sup>3</sup>

3 Paul Scheffer, *De sputterende emancipatiemachine*. In: NRC, 18 March 2006.

The border posts of *Allochstan* are once again the old-time markers of racial distinction and superiority, *black* (schools) and *white* (flight), testifying to the ethnocentric mindset of the *True Dutch* discourse. Some suggest that in a few decades nobody will understand the present day Dutch hoopla of the *allochton-autochthon* distinction.<sup>4</sup> Sensing the wrong message, *allochtons* have occasionally been relabelled as bi-cultural citizens, or *New Dutch*. Yet in the meantime *Allochstan* is a hard-core reality, a telling imagination as well as a social-economic and political demonstration.

The *allochton* was designed with good intentions, i.e. for *affirmative action* (*doelgroepenbeleid*), a policy tailored to the specifics of various immigrant populations. To mark this distinction and to determine the scope of the *allochton* problem, a monitoring device with a range of supposedly objective indicators had to ascertain how immigrants were doing. The monitoring system had to probe the impact of government policies, and in particular the changes that had been put into effect over the years. Did these policies make a difference with regard to labour market participation; residential (de-) segregation; school performance; contacts with autochthons; or fluency in Dutch language? Monitoring the effects of these policies required detailed classification: date of entry in the Netherlands; age; sex; ethnicity; first and second-generation immigrant; and countries of origin, which were lumped into a western and non-western category. Rather surreptitiously the *allochton* came to life and since its designation the *allochton* has become a cornerstone of the discourse on immigration and integration in the Netherlands.

The *allochton* is permanently questioned as to how he is doing on a range of *integration* benchmarks. *Integration* is a *prima facie* case, which does not need to be argued. The flipside of questioning the *allochton* is of course the Netherlands' reception of these immigrants. How are the *autochthons* behaving, and what do they think of these immigrants? How accommodating are the *True Dutch*? Are they on good footing or at least at peace with the *allochton* in the neighbourhood, at school and work, and generally as Dutch citizens and compatriots? Are they a hospitable people? The answers to these questions are not systematically monitored. The *autochthon* is taken for granted – *as is* – and not recognized as a necessary part of the *integration* equation. The norm for good behaviour is set by modern day Dutch manners.

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4 Interview with Anton Zuiderveld. In: De Volkskrant, 9 May 2009.

### *Processing Immigrants Becoming Dutch*

Acquiring Dutch citizenship contracted over time different meanings in terms of status, practical behaviour, civic engagement and cultural identification. The rites of passage of immigrants into the Netherlands changed according to the strain of Dutch identity that dominated immigration policy and civic discourse at a particular point in time. Netherlands immigration policy tottered from an attitude of multicultural benevolence to a policy that eventually imposed strict conditions on immigrants and their integration into Dutch society, especially those who originated from non-western countries. How this *integration* and *cultural identification* must be defined was open to interpretation.

Such ambiguity is in stark contrast with *The American Way*, which leaves the immigrant no doubt what it means and requires being *American* (Verhagen, 2006).<sup>5</sup> Already on arrival in the USA the immigrant is fully aware that he – or she – has to learn the language, the national anthem, constitution and history, and political structure of the USA. He must defer to the Stars and Stripes, make a living, and live in due respect of the law of the land. Becoming an American is first of all a matter of survival with minimal government support. *If I can make it there, I can make it anywhere*.<sup>6</sup> That is not about Amsterdam or Rotterdam, but about New York! On the other hand, an immigrant in the USA does not need to alienate his origin or ethnicity, but is instead encouraged to become a proud hyphenated Polish-, Mexican-, or Chinese-American, one who is an American while pronouncing the country of his origin as well, in Asia, Europe or Latin America. No loyalty questions asked: ‘Yes, you can have a “hyphenated identity” if you insist on it - but you had better know which side of the hyphen your bread is buttered on’ (Caldwell, 2009, 338).

*The American Way* enforces immigrants to *Americanize*. Caldwell argues that it is a European myth to imagine the USA as an open immigration country: ‘America may be open in theory, but in practice it exerts Procrustean pressures on its immigrants to conform, and it is its pressures, not its openness, that have bound America’s diverse citizens together as one people’ (Caldwell, 2009, 338). These pressures to *Americanize* are never stated; they are embedded in the

5 Frans Verhagen, *The American Way: Wat Nederland kan leren van het meest succesvolle immigratieland*. In: De Groene Amsterdammer, 6 March 2009.

6 Frank Sinatra: *If I can make it there, I can make it anywhere. It’s up to you - New York, New York*. In: New York New York Lyrics.

social and economic systems through which immigrants must move in order to survive.

Becoming Dutch or obtaining Dutch citizenship was a low-key event in the early years of immigration. That changed in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century, when a *citizenship* momentum was spruced up. The era of *live and let live* was over, and had been replaced with a hands-on policy. Immigrants had to be *integrated*, becoming participating citizens in Dutch society; they had to show civic engagement. Naturalisation ceremonies like the ones practiced in the USA are now obligatory for an aspiring Dutch national, officiated by mayors, enlivened by speeches, the national anthem with its confusing line '*Ben ick van Duytschen bloet*' ('*Am I of German blood*') (Translation Wikipedia), and decorated with banners. Dutch cookies, coffee and tea must make everybody feel at home. But these festivities do not tell what is specifically *Dutch* these days. What is *Being Dutch* about apart from being citizen of a rich, modern, democratic and liberal welfare state? These qualities of Dutch citizenship are shared with many of the European Union states.

A range of public policies for minorities was set up (*minderhedenbeleid*) to help these groups negotiate Dutch society, to answer their needs and guarantee their equal rights, including access to social services such as welfare and unemployment benefits. These *minority* policies were carried by a broad consensus. In those years, the Dutch immigration policy centred on recognition of an immigrant's culture and identity. Diversity was okay, and teaching migrants in their own language and culture (*onderwijs in eigen taal en cultuur*) was encouraged.<sup>7</sup> This policy was not only an offshoot of Dutch liberalism, it was also rooted in the belief that the immigrants would eventually go home; such made them fit to travel, and to settle in at home again.

A consequence of the *live and let live* policy was of course that the immigrants stuck to themselves, in their own blocs of origin, which migrants all over the world tend to do, building upon the *new world* experience of familiar forerunners. That they remained apart from the *True Dutch* did not raise concern at first. On the contrary, the Netherlands' history of a segregated bloc based society and concurrent political system facilitated the classification of immigrants as a new bloc. The *allochton* bloc supposedly had its own *modus operandi*, just as the other blocs once had, supported by a welfare system that smoothed troublesome wrinkles away, but at a price. Generous welfare provisions

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7 Meindert Fennema, presentation in De Rode Hoed, Amsterdam, September 2008.

did not encourage competitive attitudes on the labour market, an ambition to learn the Dutch language, or acquiring corporate or business skills, which resulted in permanent high unemployment rates among the *allochtons*. This welfare trap contributed to the image of the *allochton* as being a forager of the Dutch welfare state.

When it became apparent that these immigrants were going to stay, the multicultural policy lingered on as major political parties, especially the Socialists and Christian Democrats, but Liberals as well, still had positive memories of the good old times when Dutch politics was based on ideological bloc allegiances of home grown religious and ideological minorities. These blocs had worked well for its members: equal voting rights, free education for all and according to one's belief, and welfare provisions for people in need were among the valued legacies of that era. Why should this not work for the emancipation of the imported minorities with their own distinct culture and identity?

The *live and let live* immigration policy went into general bankruptcy for obvious reasons. No longer could it be overlooked that this policy had created ethnic segregation, welfare dependency, and *black* schools. And the high crime rates among Dutch youngsters of foreign and Dutch Caribbean origin had to be addressed. In 1991, Bolkestein, a prominent spokesman of the Liberal party in Parliament and Dutch media, and later a European Union Commissioner, was the first to advocate a hands-on policy of *integrating* immigrants, while condemning the noncommittal approach of the previous years. He argued against the *all is relative* supposition of the multicultural discourse, and warned that *Islam* was a threat to European civilization. Bolkestein concluded that *integration* while at the same time maintaining one's culture and identity, was incompatible, a contradiction in terms.<sup>8</sup> In some circles Bolkestein's call for change was welcomed as a new realism in the Dutch discourse on multiculturalism; he had the nerve to break taboos. But many took issue with the style and manner in which Bolkestein had voiced his opinion; 'playing on a simplified hierarchical opposition between *us*, the representatives of Western civilization, and *them*, those belonging to the world of Islam, which overlooked the injustices and evil perpetrated in the name of the former while ignoring the actual diversity within the latter' (Prins, 2002). Gradually the mainstream position evolved in the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> Century from the noble advancement of a pluralist and multi-cultural reform

8 A few years later Bolkestein propagated a distributive settlement of immigrants in order to prevent the growth of minority ghettos.

to a hands-on policy of *integrating* minorities: 'from equal civil rights and entitlements to civic obligations and participation; from citizenship-as-status to citizenship-as-practice' (Fermin, 1997, 292).

Citizenship-as-practice, or citizen participation (*burgerschap*), opened a critical account of an immigrant's behaviour and identification, in other words, of his *cultural integration*, also termed *assimilation*. While for decades the Netherlands had celebrated a *live and let live* policy, now the new arrivals had to transform themselves so that they would become Dutch *burghers*, not only by abiding the law of the land but displaying civic engagement, just as the *True Dutch* supposedly manifested. Cultural difference gained currency in the transfer process of an immigrant becoming Dutch. A modernity problem was defined between the culture of various immigrant groups and the demands of modern-day Dutch society (Brink, 2006, 233-269).

*Cultural integration* became a new metaphor for dealing with the *allochtons*. Jan-Peter Balkenende, former Prime Minister of four short-term cabinets, critically pointed out that Dutch integration policy had mainly focussed on work, income and status, but that 'identification with the cultural goals of our society, the binding values and norms' had hardly been incorporated (Kleijwegt, 2006, 90). This *functional* focus had left a *cultural black hole* (sic) that must be filled without delay (Brink, 2006, 271). The *cultural integration* variety raised awkward questions. Are immigrants from Suriname not well *integrated* because their family takes care of the elderly and sick while the modern Dutch way is a one-way trip to the nursing home? And must the self-sufficient and leave-me-alone Chinese immigrant become a street-corner-worker for gay rights? Must Orthodox Jewish neighbourhoods in New York City with a median age of 20, or even just over 14 (due to high birth rates in these communities) be *integrated*?<sup>9</sup> Hanif Kureishi opines: 'I don't think there's any obligation for anyone to integrate [...] [Immigrants] are people entitled to live as they wish [...] why are only immigrants or their children asked to integrate? [...]The (British) royal family don't integrate [...] Prince Philip doesn't integrate.'<sup>10</sup> Closer home, how to conceive of an *allochton* culturally *integrating* into the Netherlands when his children are shoved into unappealing black schools?

9 *New York City Growing More Diverse, Census Finds*. In: The New York Times, 9 December 2008.

10 The New York Times Magazine, 10 August, 2008.

The *integration* discourse decrees the *allochton* to be a participating citizen, showing civic engagement, while many *True Dutch* citizens have become passive and politically uninterested consumers: *a calculating citizen* (Van Doorn, 2009, 500) (Lubbers) (Judt, 2010, 135). Willem Schinkel articulates loud and clear: ‘*Integration?*’ *No, thank you!*’ (Schinkel, 2008, 69). Nonetheless the norm was set that immigrants must become Dutch *burghers*, i.e. participating citizens. To that end the Dutch *burgher* had to be defined, explicating what must be expected from the immigrants. And that became a problem in itself!

Dutch culture, history, values and tastes were brushed up, squeezing the erstwhile bloc-based denominational differences into a *True Dutch* space of enlightenment, freedom of speech, women’s rights and gay pride, just to name a few of the entitlements. A cultural divide between new immigrants and *True Dutch* society was brought forward to explain the mismatch at school and the labour market, the public domain, and in general, the way of doing things. The bankruptcy was defined as a *multicultural drama*, and ever since this term was introduced *cultural difference* acquired strong agency in the *integration* discourse. It naturally followed that immigrants must make adjustments in the process of becoming *Dutch*. Precisely at this junction, the integration discourse acquired a cultural dimension that – as a matter of course – was open to widely different interpretations of what being Dutch entailed.

Substantive characteristics of Dutch identity have been canonized in the law of the land while others only find a temporary place in the *Canon of Dutch History*, or are just part of Dutch folklore and popular sentiment. Some proclaim that the Dutch must be proud of *Being Dutch*, while critics on the other end on the nationalist scale contently claim that the Dutch actually lack such an exaggerated opinion of themselves. This multiplicity of Dutch identity correlates with different attitudes towards integration of immigrants, the extremes being assimilation into the *True Dutch* fold on one hand, and recognition of multicultural diversity under the law of the land on the other. The *True Dutch* trajectory stands out because of populist appeals that proclaim the Netherlands as *our land (ons land)*. *True Dutch* is shored up by a *polarization* of differences. Where the typical Dutch polder-democracy entailed cautious deliberation between ideological blocs and social-economic strata to reach ultimately a consensus, now the Dutch were encouraged to polarize loud and clear in unambiguous terms the differences they encounter in relation to the *allochtons*,

and particularly the Muslim variety: '[...] in tolerant Holland, *ersatz* debates on national identity and criteria for citizenship substitute for the political courage required to confront popular prejudice and the challenges of integration' (Judt, 2010, 172-173).

For many, being Dutch has become a one-dimensional identity, and that by default. In *True Dutch* hands, the plurality of Dutch identity is reduced to a character that doesn't feel good about all that is foreign, especially immigrants from non-western lands, specifically its Muslim cohort. Liberal Dutch identity yielded to populist prejudice and cultural differences gained paramount significance, alienating the *allochton* and so reflexively necessitated an assimilation trajectory of how to become Dutch.

### *The Moors, Once More*

The terrorist attacks in the USA on 9/11, and subsequent fundamentalist Islam attacks in Madrid, London and Amsterdam, gave leverage to those who oppose immigration, putting 'our kind of people' first. For them, fundamental Islamism was a godsend, boosting their cause. The alarm which Bolkestein had rang over *Islam* 10 years before in 1991, inspired after 9/11 a motley collection of followers pointing to Islam as *the problem* of an ill-advised Dutch multicultural discourse. Muslims in Holland felt their status had changed (Allievi, 2006, 37). They were no longer seen as neighbours, workmates, colleagues, or fellow students but first and foremost as Muslims and, as such, people who had to answer for all Islamist wrongdoing wherever it happened, not only at present but sustained by the long history of conflict between Christendom, East and West, and Islam.

This history has become popular reading; a steady stream of books suggests an atmosphere of impending revolution, violence and war: *Worlds at War. The 2,500-year struggle between East and West* (Pagden); *Persian Fire* (Holland) a dramatic story about [...] *the Battle for the West*; and *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (Huntington) are just a few of such writings. Andrew Wheatcroft's *Infidels* traces the history of *maledicta*,<sup>11</sup> words and images of hate, between Christian and Muslim infidels: 'An ambivalence toward the Islamic

11 The malediction has not been of the same kind: 'Certainly from the invention of printing, and through the proliferation of images, the West's *maledicta* have been infinitely more potent and widespread. But now, as the clock moves on, the East has learned the lesson. "Islam" uses the printing press and visual and electronic media with the same skill and sophistication as the West. And it has also learned how these new techniques can now carry the East's *maledicta*, farther and more potently than the scribe's pen.' In: *Infidels. A History of Conflict between Christendom and Islam*, p. 291.

world that was magnified by the events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent “war on terror”. Yet those events only catalyzed a fear that has older and deeper roots’ (Wheatcroft, 2005, 316). Roger Crowley goes back to the fall of Constantinople in 1453 which he considers as the start of a huge renewal of anti-Islamic sentiment: ‘Words of mouth emphasized the bestiality of the Turks, the ferocity of their attack on Christendom – themes that would ring loudly in Europe for hundreds of years’ (Crowley, 2005, 238-239). When promoting her book *Nomad* in the Netherlands in 2010, Ayaan Hirsi Ali pronounced that the relation between Islam and the West would inevitably lead to a ‘great war’. These histories of past and coming ‘worlds at war’ sell well.

Bruce Bawer’s *While Europe Slept* contains a mouth full of *maledicta* on the Muslim side. This book simmers with words and images of how intensely Islam hates the West, not based on research, but by randomly quoting everyone who fits his mental frame. Those in Western Europe who do not agree with his trail of *maledicta* are sleeping. Bawer speaks of Europe’s *Weimar* moment and questions why the Dutch didn’t see what he saw: the rage in the eye of many Muslim men at the sight of that ultimate spectacle of dishonour - a Dutch woman bicycling to work (Bawer, 2006, 34). A few years later, in 2009, Bawer writes a sequel: *Surrender. Appeasing Islam. Sacrificing Freedom* in which he suggests that Europeans don’t appreciate the Muslim threat to their shores. They are sacrificing their freedoms, cowering in fear for radical Muslim retaliation. A New York Times book review gave it a thumbs up, declaring Bawer ‘unquestionably correct, and that fact is simply terrifying.’ Bawer’s country of residence, Norway, was reviewed as ‘the archetype, even the caricature, of the liberal European mind-set.’<sup>12</sup> Apparently the liberal European mind has completely lost its senses.

In *Reflections on the Revolution in Europe*, Caldwell implies that Europe – an insecure, malleable, relativistic culture – is giving in to Islam, ‘a magnificent religion that has been at times over the centuries, a glorious and generous culture.’ Caldwell sketches the outlines of a weak Europe and the massive culture of Islam that interconnects across national borders: ‘There are 1.2 billion Muslims bound together by the Internet in a global *ummah*, or nation of believers. In most cases this is a pro forma kind of belonging, but in some

12 Stephen Pollard, *The Appeasers*. In: New York Times Book Review, 24 July 2009: ‘Surrender: Appeasing Islam, Sacrificing Freedom.’ By Bruce Bawer, Doubleday, 2009

it involves a fervid kind of loyalty' (Caldwell, 2009, 173; Italics mine) Quoting Bernard Lewis' synopsis *Europe will be[come] part of the Arabic West, of the Maghreb* (Caldwell, 2009, 14), Caldwell argues that Islam – a vital world culture – is going to dominate European modernity which offers no higher ideal of the good life beyond travel, longevity and consumerisms (Caldwell, 2009, 348-349).

True believers of a dangerous Islam do not take 'no' for an answer. Western politicians who appear to be setting Islam aside as the main cause of terrorism do so, Caldwell suggests, 'because they fear, deep down, that it is the main cause [...] If Islam has nothing to do with terrorism, then why do all European governments feel the need to reach out to Muslim groups in the aftermath of any terrorist attack?' (Caldwell, 2009, 283). The answer may simply be that on those occasions Muslim communities were assaulted and needed protection. After the murder of Theo van Gogh in Amsterdam by an Islamist activist, Mosques were bombed and schools set on fire. 'We are at war,' said a Dutch minister, underscoring these incidents. In the USA, immediately after a shoot-out in 2009, killing 13 people supposedly by a Muslim man, Muslim communities sought protection. The Council of American-Islamic Relations issued a statement of condemnation, and added: 'Unfortunately, based on past experience, we also urge American Muslims, and those who may be perceived to be Muslim, to take appropriate precautions to protect themselves, their families and their religious institutions from possible backlash.' In a separate statement the Muslim Public Affairs Council called on 'all members of American Muslim communities to be in contact with local law enforcement for the safety and security of their communities and their institutions.'<sup>13</sup>

Caldwell wags a finger at 'Europe's predicament [which] involves population decline, aging, immigration, and *the steady implantation of a foreign religion and culture in city after city*' (Caldwell, 2009, 327; Italics mine). Hiding between the covers of his book, Caldwell rings alarms over an Islam *ummah* takeover. Yet at a presentation in Amsterdam, Femke Halsema, a Green Left Parliamentarian, questioned the cultural unity of her Muslim compatriots she encounters everyday, the schoolyard of her children being one of the locations: 'My Muslim neighbours hardly agree on anything among themselves.' She opposed the image of a collective Muslim presence in the Nether-

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13 Robert Cohen, *Alleged shooter's name prompts response from American Muslims*. CNN, 6 November, 2009.

lands, which made Caldwell accede: ‘Maybe it is different here.’ In a Dutch weekly he was quoted as saying: ‘I really don’t know how this [Islam in Netherlands] will proceed’, forgetting his ‘scholarly’ thesis *on the steady implantation of Islam in city after city*.

Dutch citizens, including Muslim compatriots, are bombarded with narratives about the dangers of Islam, giving rise to virulent anti-Muslim sentiments in politics, media and opinion polls. Dutch Muslims are identified with the *Islam*, not as a religion but as a ‘totalitarian ideology’, and ‘the main cause of terrorism.’ Those who do not see the threat of *Islam*, and by its implication the danger of a cohort of Muslims in the Netherlands, are cast away as molluscs without vertebrae (*pakjes boter*). A new *Ottomania* is incorporated in the persona of the Dutch Muslim immigrant, introducing an Islamophobic infusion into the nation’s discourse. Immigrants who have come to the Netherlands in search for a better life are reconstructed as the messengers of powers that aim to establish a New Caliphate in the West. A case in point is a publication by the Scientific Institute of the Christian Union, *Conditions for peace; The arrival of the Islam, the Integration of Muslims and the Identity of the Netherlands*, which can be read as an instruction manual for Dutch immigration officers on what to look out for (Segers, 2009; Translation mine):

*Islam and the West are worlds apart [...] In Muslim society Jews and Christians are second-rate citizens [...] Encounters between Arab Muslims and the West do not generate the best in the Islam [...] The murder of Theo van Gogh stands in the context of the crisis of the Islam [...] Turkey’s membership of the European Union is a bridge too far because of cultural-religious differences [...] Turkey’s Islamization brought about that radical Muslims violently attacked Christians [...] The lack of freedom and equality in the Muslim world spills over to the Netherlands.*

Huntington’s sound bite *Islam has bloody borders* is recalled to describe the encounter of Islam with other religions, proving that Islam cannot accommodate pluralism and religious diversity. Portraying Islam with a history of ‘bloody borders,’ while having a blind spot for the bloody violence in recent European history, betrays memory and reason. Astounding is the hyped-up history of Islam against the backdrop of the killing fields – *pools of blood* – in recent European history. Ian Kershaw addresses the era of violence of two World Wars in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century: ‘let us remind ourselves [...] of the sheer scale of the violence,

that is the *quantitative* difference with what had gone before, in the ‘era of violence’ (Ian Kershaw, 2008, 363)

*In the First World War, the dead totalled more than eight million military casualties and perhaps [...] a further five million civilians [...] in the Second World War, 40 million military and civilian deaths would be the minimal estimate [...] Beyond these figures are those of the refugees forced from hearth and homeland: four to five million in 1918-1922, as many as 40 million ‘displaced persons’ between 1945 and 1950.*

This happened in Europe with its commendable past of Christianity, Enlightenment and Reason. Barbaric ideologies and totalitarian regimes drove European people not so long ago to slaughter each other on a scale never before seen. The Judeo-Christian descendents of this history are not condemned to an eternal purgatory from which they cannot be released. Precisely that is done to Muslim immigrants in the Dutch integration discourse. They are projected as the couriers of a New Caliphate who aim to regain the Judeo-Christian West by all possible means; they are reconstructed into dangerous agents bringing down the Western World.

Reacting to the danger of a resurgent Caliphate, some urge that *They* must be deported home. Others urge that *We* must have an open and sincere debate about how to integrate these *Ottomanian* Muslims into the Netherlands fold. In a perverse layering of roles, those who first introduce an irreconcilable Islam into the Dutch discourse, define the integration of the Muslim as the biggest issue of our time, especially in terms of *belonging to* and *identification with* the Netherlands. These righteous scaremongers doubt a happy ending to the convoluted embrace of their Muslim compatriots. Questions about a possible outcome, e.g. *Will Islam cause the Enlightened West to collapse indeed, or is this a transition period that with patience and goodwill can eventually be solved?* receive an ominous reply: ‘I don’t dare to tell.’<sup>14</sup>

In this murky ambience, immigrants are asked where they belong: *the group of ethnic origin or the Netherlands?* Against the backdrop of all the *EURABIA* rhetoric it should not come as a surprise that among Turkish *allochtons*, a majority of 58 % identifies primarily with their own group; this is 40% for Moroccan *allochtons*. One out of 5 young

<sup>14</sup> Margeet Fogteloo, *Het diepe onbehagen rond de Islam. Nederland is een zacht pakje boter*. In: De Groene Amsterdammer, 30 October 2009.

Turkish *allochtons*, and one out of 10 young Moroccan *allochtons* wishes to re-migrate from *Allochstan on the North Sea* to their country of origin (Segers, 2009, 70-106). Turkish nationalism or Islam is sorted out in particular to be detrimental to developing a sense of belonging to the Netherlands.

These immigrants feeling somehow unsettled in the Netherlands may as well be attributed to the Dutch habitat of *black* schools, daily tremors of a resurgent *Muslim Caliphate in city after city*, and the 3 x higher unemployment rate in *Allochstan* (CBS, 2007, 2010). Ignoring these structural components of social cohesion, admonishing *allochtons* to adapt to Dutch citizenship (*burgerschap*) – and to identify with the Netherlands – (Schuyt, 2009, 130) is meaningless. Under such circumstances *integration* does not make sense.

### *Pimping the Allochton; Pumping the Issues*

The narrative of an *allochton* and Muslim takeover of Dutch cities finds a foothold in Dutch media, news bulletins, statistical vocabulary and popular literature. *Immigrant* and *allochton* statistics are being prostituted to catch the attention of an insecure public that wishes to hold on to the good old times. Schoo, a distinguished journalist in the Netherlands, wrote in 2000, 'Amsterdam and Rotterdam count more immigrants per capita than a classic immigrant city as New York' (Schoo, 2008, 90). This cannot be right. At the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century the immigrant share of New York's population was slightly more than 40 % (Salvo, 2002, 11) while the (first generation) immigrant's share (western and non-western) of Amsterdam was 27.8 % in 2002, and 28 % in 2008, much lower than in New York.<sup>15</sup> Rotterdam's (first generation) immigrant share (western and non-western) is at the same (lower) level: 24 % in 2000, and 26.6 % in 2009 [...].<sup>16</sup>

Immigrants and *allochtons* are often not distinguished from one another, interchangeable as it were, obliterating the difference and so inflating figures and concomitantly the issues. In 2006 the number of *allochtons* was almost twice as much as the number of first-generation immigrants. In much of the public discourse on immigration, the *allochton* has a negative connotation, which is attached to figures that

15 *Amsterdamse bevolking naar generatie, 1 januari 2002 en 2008*. Gemeente Amsterdam; Dienst Onderzoek en Statistiek.

16 *Bevolking van Rotterdam naar ethniciteit kort en generatie, 1 januari 2000-2009 (tijdsreeks)*. E-mail Piet Burger, April 7, 2010. Publiekszaken Rotterdam, Bewerking COS.

include both non-western and western immigrants, and those who would in other countries be labelled as *first-generation* citizens, because they are born there. This crossover makes for a substantial social and political difference, spreading the negatives attached to the *allochton* over a much larger population of Dutch nationals, and thus suggesting a much larger problem.

Especially for the largest cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, *allochton speak* generates distorted images. The *allochton* share of Amsterdam's population was 49.3 % in 2009, and 34.8 % when limited to non-western *allochton*. The prognosis for 2015 (made in 2007) is that 51.3 % of the Amsterdam population will be *allochton*; and 36.3 % when singling out the non-western *allochton*.<sup>17</sup> The share of *first-generation Netherlands'* citizens – born in the Netherlands – is 21.7 % in Amsterdam.


Out of Rotterdam's total population in 2009 46.9 % is *allochton*, divided over 36,4 % non-western and 10.5 % western. Rotterdam's population includes 20.4 % *first generation Netherlands'* citizens, split over 4.9 % western and almost 15.5 % non-western. These subtleties are lost in Dutch *allochton speak* which, when using the same numbers, composes a rather different population image for Rotterdam: 53.1 % Dutch (*Nederlander*) and 46.9 % *allochtons*. Following that jargon, both Amsterdam and Rotterdam seem to be cities at the point of being overrun by *allochtons*.

Population graphs I and II (next page) visualize Dutch *allochton speak* in regards to the population of Amsterdam (graph I) and Rotterdam (graph II). The overall picture for these cities is similar. Graph IA (Amsterdam) en IIA (Rotterdam) imagine *allochton speak* as used in day-to-day language, only making a distinction between cohorts of autochthons (*True Dutch*) and *allochtons*, without further classification. In both cities autochthons and *allochtons* count each nearly half of the total population. In graph IB and IIB the *allochtons* are sub-divided according to western and non-western origin. Immigrants are singled out in graph IC and IIC, in line with standard immigration statistics. The 2<sup>nd</sup> generation immigrants are classified as 1<sup>st</sup> generation Dutch. In both cities, Amsterdam and Rotterdam, *True Dutch* + 1<sup>st</sup> generation Dutch comprise almost  $\frac{3}{4}$  of the total population.


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17 Department of Research and Statistics, Amsterdam, *Prognose 2007, populatie Amsterdam 2007-2020 naar generatie*.

*Graph I*  
*Allochton Speak*  
 Amsterdam, 2009. Total Population: 754,842



*Graph II*  
*Allochton Speak*  
 Rotterdam, 2009. Total Population: 587,161



See Annex Chapter 4, pp. 114-115

In USA immigration vocabulary, an immigrant's children who are born in the USA are *first generation Americans*. Paraphrasing Netherlands *allochton speak* in USA immigration vocabulary is revealing. In Amsterdam, instead of being overrun by *allochtons* (graph IA), the 'Dutch' share of the population is 72.4 % (incl. the *New Dutch*, born in the Netherlands) (graph IC). This applies as well to Rotterdam, it is close to be overrun according to *allochton speak* – 53.1 % *Dutch* and 46.9 % *allochton* (graph IIA) – but overwhelmingly 'Dutch' – 73.5 % – when including the *New Dutch*. Rotterdam's immigrant population is 26.5 % (graph IIC). The proportion of *non-western immigrants* in both cities is around 20 %, and is declining.<sup>18</sup>

*Allochton-speak* is *Gefundenes Fressen* for the *True Dutch* brigades. The anti-immigrant *Party for Freedom* confronted in May 2009 the minister for Integration in Parliament with some *allochton-speak* questions<sup>19</sup>

*Are you familiar with the article: Autochthons almost a minority? Do you share with us that a possible majority of non-western allochtons in 2012 is unwanted in view of problems of criminality, welfare-dependence and integration attached to this group? Which action will you take to ensure that autochthons will in a short run not become a minority in Rotterdam? Are you willing to stop the immigration of people originating from Muslim countries with immediate effect? If not, why not?* (Translation mine)

No wonder that the *allochton* has become the darling of the extreme right, especially when depicted as Muslim. In populist appeals, and questions in Parliament, the *allochton* population is seamlessly identified with people originating from non-western lands and Muslim countries, not making a distinction between non-western immigrants who supposedly *must be held at bay*, and immigrants originating from western countries who supposedly *do no harm*.

Against better wisdom Ian Buruma painstakingly creates in *Murder in Amsterdam* a collective *allochton-cum-Muslim* body in the lilywhite bosom of the Dutch nation, based on statistics *that do not lie* (*meten is weten*) (Buruma, 2006, 23)

18 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Regionale bevolkings- en allochtonen prognose 2005-2025.

19 Minister for Integration, answering questions of members of Parliament, dated 7 May 2009, concerning the news that autochthons are almost a minority in Rotterdam. Letter of Minister, The Hague, 15 July 2009.

*In 1999, 45 percent of the population (of Amsterdam) was of foreign origin. If projections are right, this will be 52 percent in 2015. And the majority will be Muslim.*

Buruma frames Amsterdam's population of *foreign origin* as a combination of western and non-western immigrants, which will increase from 45 % in 1999 to 52 % in 2015. In shorthand Dutch immigration jargon, the *allochtonen* will become a majority in 2015 in Amsterdam. Buruma is well aware of the negatives attached to the *allochton*, in his own words, *an ugly, and relatively new, bureaucratic term for people of alien, more specifically non-European, origin* (Buruma, 2006, 149). Nonetheless his presentation of *population of foreign origin* includes western immigrants (first and second generation) and so spreads the negative *allochton* connotation over a much larger number of immigrants. The share of western immigrants in Amsterdam's population is estimated to be 15 % in 2015, while the share of non-western immigrants (first and second generation) is expected to rise from 34.8 % in 2009 to 36.3 % in 2015, a far distance from the 52% majority Buruma projects.<sup>20</sup>

Buruma's statement that in 2015 a majority of the population of foreign origin will be Muslim does not hold water. In 2006 11.4 % of Amsterdam's population of 18 years and over is Muslim according to the Amsterdam Burger Monitor<sup>21</sup>; this is 14.3 % when calculated on an updated Central Bureau of Statistics method.<sup>22</sup> A prognosis for 2015 estimates the Muslim share of the 'population of foreign origin' to be 35.7%; far from being a majority.<sup>23</sup> For the overall population of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) estimates that in 2050 around 9 % will be Muslim: 'If truth be told there is no Muslim tsunami in sight', the *Volkskrant* captioned in October 2007 (Translation mine).<sup>24</sup>

20 Research and Statistics Amsterdam: Prognosis 2007, Population Amsterdam 2007-2020, According to Generation.

21 Research and Statistics Amsterdam, *Aantal moslims in Amsterdam volgens de Amsterdamse burgermonitor (18 jaar en ouder, 2006)*.

22 Research and Statistics Amsterdam, *Aantal moslims in Amsterdam volgens de nieuwe CBS-methode (18 jaar en ouder, 2006)*. .

23 Research and Statistics Amsterdam, *Prognose 2007, Populatie Amsterdam 2007-2020 naar generatie*. And: Centraal Bureau of Statistics, Marieke van Herten & Freddy Otten, *Nieuwe schatting van het aantal Islamieten in Nederland*. Muslim share according to origin: Surinamese 10.3; Antillean 0, Turks 87, Moroccan 90, Other non-western 33; and Western 2 %.

24 The Nederlands Interdisciplinair Demografisch Instituut (NIDI) estimates that in 2050 ca 9 percent of the Netherlands population will be Muslim: 'echt geen tsunami te bekennen.' In: *De Volkskrant*, 6 October 2007.

‘Statistics do no lie’ but can be manipulated to one’s end. Buruma’s presentation is based on official statistics of Amsterdam that supposedly underscore what he wants to suggest: Dutch cities are being ‘Muslimized’. Western and non-western immigrants are thrown together. No distinction is made between the different grades and shades of Muslim believers. The fact that the share of first-generation non-western immigrants in Amsterdam and Rotterdam hovers around 20 %, and is expected to decline to 15 % in 2025, is ignored.<sup>25</sup> Buruma pumps up the *integration* monitor in order to create an image of Dutch cities being overrun by foreigners and Muslims. Such an image is fodder for anti-Muslim sentiment and *xenophobic* forces. These images explain how immigrants are increasingly being defined as Muslims: *How & Why “Immigrants” became “Muslims”* (Allievi, 2006).

Pimping the *allochton*, and especially its Muslim component, serves extreme opinion and casts the *allochton* as a scary reality that populist voices aim to create. Multicultural liberals are taken hostage as they are forced to distance themselves from these voices, contesting that ‘it is not as bad’, which necessarily implies that also they seem to agree that *something is rotten* in the state of the Netherlands.

### *The Law of the Land*

An alternative to *integration* of immigrants is sought in a citizen’s commitment to the democratic state and law of the land. Though *integration* aims to reconstruct the nation as a whole, it paradoxically creates a divide between those who are – by virtue of their *True Dutch* definition – *integrated* and those who are not, while political consensus is lacking about what constitutes the difference between *being Dutch* and those who must be *integrated*. The canonized law of the land applies to all citizens, irrespective their origin. According to this view the management of universal values in a heterogeneous multicultural society must be entrusted to the rule of law, safeguarding the plurality of political orientation and religious belief, as well as personal freedom from group pressures (Schuyt, 2009, 96). The law of the land incorporates principles and norms that set standards for all, while *integration* emphasizes that especially immigrants must break down the walls of *Allochstan*. Respecting the law of the land is demanded of all Dutch citizens.

25 Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek, Regionale bevolkings- en allochtonen prognose 2005-2025.

The Netherlands immigration policy (or lack of policy) was at first marked with a *live and let live* signature. This was followed by a search for social cohesion, which translated into an *integration* trajectory for immigrants. This *integration* appeared loaded with ambiguities, encompassing immigrants' access to work, housing, education and welfare on one hand and cultural integration on the other. Among the cultural conditions of being Dutch, learning the Dutch language was an obvious requirement for social-economic, civic and political participation. The Dutch language constitutes a cultural bridge that immigrants must cross to become citizens of the Netherlands. But apart from Dutch language, no consensus prevailed defining other cultural conditions for becoming Dutch. What Dutch standards should be applied? Which type of national identity should be endorsed? Among first-generation Netherlands' citizens a spirit of *go to hell with your integration* has popped up (Izz ad-Din Ruhullessin, 2010; Translation mine).<sup>26</sup>

*This generation does not wish to abide by the absurd demands that, under the cover of integration, adjustment, emancipation, living together or 'understanding each other', we have to put up with. This generation has regained its self-respect and doesn't slavishly ask whether they are integrating well enough in the eyes of the autochthons. [...] We are Dutch citizens who refuse to be dealt with as colonial subjects. The Netherlands is our land; we are co-owners of this land.*

Unease with arbitrary cultural impositions in the Netherlands integration discourse should not be surprising. In a multicultural nation cultural restraint cuts both ways. Yet when these protesters claim formal recognition of Islamic family and inheritance law, for instance the ruling that Muslim women inherit half a man's portion, they may collide with the law of the land, just as home grown Dutch minorities have been warned. Dutch Reformed Schools cannot be allowed to expel gay pupils and teachers, and Dutch political parties are not allowed to exclude women from being candidates. In 2010 the Netherlands Supreme Court (*Hoge Raad*) ordered the politically conservative Reformed Party (SGP) to allow women on their electoral slate. The Reformed Daily Paper reacted furiously, stating that

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26 Izz ad-Din Ruhullessin, Loop naar de hel met je integratie. In: De Volkskrant, 29 April 2010.

*equality fundamentalism* (between men and women) interfered with the freedom of religion.<sup>27</sup>

Musing over *Immigration, Islam and The West*, Caldwell singles out USA law enforcement and penal reform system as one of the social revolutions that simplified the assimilation of immigrants. Thanks to the Nixon administration, and later the war on drugs,<sup>28</sup> the US penal system became a merciless, draconian machine that holds now a quarter of the prison inmates all over the world (Caldwell, 2009, 339). In 2008 the overall state and federal prison population was at an all-time high of 1.6 million. When adding people in jail where some are held to await trial, the total number of people behind bars comes to 2.3 million. At the end of 2008, one out of every 133 residents in the USA was in prison or jail; among those almost 6 out of 10 are Black or Hispanic.<sup>29</sup> Compared with the Netherlands, the US counts over 700 inmates per 100,000 residents, the Netherlands a little more than 100, according to figures of the International Centre for Prison Studies, 2005.<sup>30</sup> Caldwell emphasizes that America is an extremely inhospitable place for immigrants who are criminally inclined, and labels *The American Way* of law enforcement as one of the US advantages in which Europe is totally lacking. Unlike Europe the USA does not harbour a sentiment that newcomers account for the bulk of the crime problem (Caldwell, 2009, 340). Proving this point are statistics showing [for Southern California] ‘that children of [...] all these immigrant groups [Chinese, Korean, Vietnamese, as well as Mexican, Salvadoran, Cambodian, and Laotian] have lower incarceration rates than all the natives [White, Black, or Mexican-American].’<sup>31</sup>

The Netherlands’ law, as all law, requires interpretation; in its operation the law is flexible, depending on circumstance and case, to be decided in court, but also negotiated by law enforcement officers on the street. The Netherlands tradition that on occasion political agreement may overrule enforcement of the law, in fact even turn a blind eye to its operation (*gedogen*), has generated grey areas for law enforcement. This *culture of tolerating transgressions* (*gedoogcultuur*)

27 *Stel er was een partij met een negerstandpunt*. In: Trouw, 15 April 2010.

28 In particular the Rockefeller Drug Laws with a minimum of 15 years to life in prison, and a maximum of 25 years to life in prison.

29 *Prison Population Up, Despite Drop in 20 States*. In: The New York Times, 9 December 2009.

30 <http://www.npdata.be/BuG/26/BuG-26.htm>

31 *Remade in America. Struggling to Rise In Suburbs Where Failing Means Fitting In*. In: The New York Times, 18 April 2009.

must be distinguished from what is known as Dutch *permissiveness* - liberal legislation and practice that makes allowance for what in other countries is contested or forbidden, for instance abortion, euthanasia, and soft drugs. Where the law creates room for allowance, detailed protocols regulate a cautious execution, firmly restricting operational margins, and so pre-empting arbitrary behaviour. Tolerating transgressions (*gedoogcultuur*) does not apply. The law of the land recognizes equality of men and women, gay rights and gay marriage, and personal freedoms, to be respected by all Dutch citizens, including those who think differently, be they Dutch *bible-belt* believers, righteous Roman Catholics or conservative Muslim immigrants.

The *culture of tolerating transgressions (gedoogcultuur)* came first under review because of the rigorous exploitation of the Dutch welfare state. Unemployment benefits, sick leave entitlements, rent assistance, artist subventions, disability payments, student scholarships, all these entitlements were handed out generously and were rather easy to obtain, which created a public finance problem. In 1990, Ruud Lubbers, Prime Minister, coined the phrase *the Netherlands is sick* when referring to unlikely high numbers of workers on disability leave. Sick leave and disability entitlements were scaled down, and under pressure of *zero tolerance* protagonists, controls were tightened.

Later, and from another angle, *zero tolerance* was propagated to uphold the Netherlands' liberal laws in the face of the multicultural reality of foreign origin that had taken root in the Netherlands. Especially legislation on women and gay rights, freedom of religion and apostasy, and freedom of expression was propped up to be enforced without cultural exceptions. Illustrative how much the *culture of tolerating transgressions (gedoogcultuur)* had shifted are Police cars and uniforms in Amsterdam with signs *Enforcement (Handhaven)*, while other Police cars as designed with *Alert and at your Service (Waakzaam en Dienstbaar)*. Apparently the *gedoogcultuur* had become so salient a Dutch way of life that specific Enforcement signs had to make the Netherlands' public understand that the Police do drive around to enforce the law.

Sadik Harchaoui, Chairman of FORUM, the Institute for Multicultural Development in the Netherlands, opposes *integration* as an encompassing frame for all kinds of social problems in a multicultural society (Harchaoui, 2008).<sup>32</sup> These problems must be

32 Sadik Harchaoui, *Rechtsstaat!* pp. 28-29. In: Rood. Ledenblad van de Partij van de Arbeid, October 2008.

confronted, in schools, at home, on the streets, the labour market, and with respect to human rights. But framing all social maladies and political misfortune in terms of *immigrants* and their *integration* feeds a political bias, i.e. that the *allochton*, and in particular its *Muslim* component, is at the root of all social frustration and political alarm. Harchaoui argues that the *allochton* discourse is loaded with biased notions, which tend to highlight failures rather than achievements. For instance, the hungry media attention for a single Muslim lawyer who refuses to stand up when magistrates enter the courtroom puts the rapid development of an *allochton* middle-class in the Netherlands on the backburner. Populist notions that Islam is a backward religion, which does not allow standing up for a *stately* Dutch judge, are once again infused into the public discourse about the *allochton*.

Instead of *integration* Harchaoui advocates upholding the *democratic rule of law* as an all-encompassing framework that includes all citizens. Within this outline the frictions of a multicultural society can be consistently defined and dealt with. Attacks on homosexuals? Or Jews? Or ex-Muslims? Labour and housing market discrimination? Violence at home, or on the streets? Honour killings? Child molestation? All wrong! Not as an *integration* issue that is attributed to the *allochton*, but first and foremost wrong by the standards of the Netherlands democratic law and public order. Law and order must be maintained irrespective of personal and cultural differences; it transcends ethnic and religious borders and focuses on citizenship (*burgerschap*) as an inclusive notion for all. One-time Christian believers who have become staunch secularists must now live in tandem with devout Muslims; and vice versa. Cultural variance only matters when it cannot be contained within the framework of democratic law and public order; it is not an *integration* issue. Harchaoui's point of view implies an emphasis on law and order for all Dutch citizens. Groups with high numbers in crime statistics or other wicked behaviour should not be singled out as ethnic representatives, and no naturalized Dutch citizen can be sent *home*. Countries of origin such as Morocco or the Netherlands Antilles cannot serve as dumping grounds for delinquent Dutch citizens who have some lineage there.

A case in point was an impassioned conflict between the Netherlands' government and the government of Netherlands Antilles, an outpost of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in the Caribbean, concerning a specific register of Antillean youngsters in the Netherlands who were considered high-risk offenders of the public order. The aim of this ethnic registration was to trace and follow these youngsters

in order to shore up their *integration*. The Antillean government opposed such a 'racist and discriminatory' registration of Dutch citizens of Antillean origin. The alternative of an encompassing register of all *high-risk* youngsters in the Netherlands did not meet with Antillean opposition.

A calling for Dutch national identity may not suffice to maintain a workable cohesion in a divided nation that polarizes ethnic, cultural and religious differences (Schuyt, 2009, 147). Instead a framework of upholding democratic law and public order for all citizens is propagated, reframing the *multicultural drama* into identification with Dutch culture that is canonized in the law of the land. Perhaps for that reason *Enforcement* has become a call to arms by Mayors, Police, Ministers and Justices as an alternative framework to the idea of *integrating* the *allochton*. Critical cultural divisions can no longer be effectively addressed by those civilizing agents of earlier days as church and school, parents, brothers and sisters, neighbourhood and other fraternities. Instead the Police have been called for as undercover agents to be used as baits, in order to protect and enforce the entitlements of women, the elderly, and more recently, homos and Jews in the Netherlands.<sup>33</sup>

Law enforcement in the Netherlands has become more severe in recent years. Crime and criminal justice statistics indicate that the Police registered more crimes and arrested more suspects, and the Courts imposed more and longer sentences. Nevertheless, the level of crime as perceived by the victims did not increase: the number of victims remained stable in the period 1995-2003 according to the Central Bureau of Statistics, or fell by some 10% according to the Police Monitor. While recorded crime rose by about 8%, the number of convictions increased by some 25% and the number of prisoners by 37% (WODC, 2006). A Dutch study shows that the Netherlands has twice as many people in prison than the Scandinavian countries (Cnossen, 2009, 58-60). More research needs to be done in order to answer the question whether law enforcement will be upgraded as one of the ways to sustain a workable cohesion, just as has been the case all along in the US. Are Police and Prison to become part of the glue for keeping the multicultural nation together?

### *A Whipping Boy*

For a long time the Netherlands was in a state of denial about

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33 *Tē vroeg voor lokjood*. In: NRC, 22 June 2010.

immigration while population statistics told a different story. The Dutch sentiment of being a superior *guide to the world* obstructed political attention for the immigration issue. The Dutch lived on high moral grounds and could not agree with a border policy to regulate immigration. The idea of making a distinction at the Dutch border was morally repulsive.<sup>34</sup>

Eventually the confrontation of the *True Dutch* with non-western immigrants on their home turf turned into to a self-righteous and egotistical Dutch identity on one hand and wild imaginations of backward and uncultured *New Dutch* on the other: 'coming out of the jungle (sic) of Turkey, Morocco and various African countries' (Verhagen, 2006, 242; Translation mine). The Dutch proclaimed themselves enlightened once more, making a radical changeover, and insisted now that their *good old times* had to be protected against the multi-cultural jungle of non-western immigrants. Thus the *allochton* was born.

Resentment against the *allochton* caught up with the anger of those who felt short-changed in the process of globalisation and the retraction of government services, to be replaced by market forces. Or by the impositions of the European Union, which only added to the insecurity over who actually governs in the Netherlands. Dutch identity was questioned over and again, and redefined in muscular terms, outdated and no longer making sense. *Allochstan* served to showcase a strong Dutch identity, but was at the same time an expression of Dutch identity losing out to challenges in the global theatre. Where once a national government guarded the commonwealth of the nation, now international governance and global market forces give and take away. Some of the Dutch appreciate these changes as gains; they feel challenged, culturally enriched, or are simply making money beyond their wildest imagination. Others obviously are losers, seeing their neighbourhoods change, sensing a loss of identity, or losing job-security to market forces and global outsourcing. They are not at ease with ethnic diversity or Islam, which is touted as a threatening religion. After all those years of solid social-economic progress, insecurity has taken the upper hand. Among others, Tony Judt especially spotlighted this insecurity in all-inclusive terms.

*Insecurity born of terrorism, of course; but also more insidiously, fear of the uncontrollable speed of change, fear of the loss of employment,*

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34 Malou van Hintum, *De dictatuur van het volk*. Interview with Paul Frissen. In: De Volkskrant, 7 November, 2009.

*fear of losing ground to others in an increasingly unequal distribution of resources, fear of losing control of the circumstances of our daily life. And, perhaps above all, fear that it is not just we who can no longer shape our lives but those in authority have also lost control, to forces beyond their reach* (Judt, 2010, 217).

Amidst all this insecurity the *allochton* stands out because he is at hand to cure the Dutch malaise, making the Dutch feel confident that something can be done: *integration of the allochton!*

The issues of the Netherlands being an immigrant country with people from non-western origin, including a large variety of Muslim believers, are intentionally pumped up by container concepts and historic overlays. In this discourse the *allochton* signifies a destructive concept that does not attribute any sort of positive identification other than aspiring to become *Dutch*, waiting a lifetime, children included, also for life. Indiscriminate concepts such as *Islam* or *Muslims* do not distinguish between fundamentalists, orthodox, *skimpy* or liberal believers, purposely magnifying and distorting the figures. A pumped up nostalgia of a historicized collision between East and West, Islam and Christendom intensifies today's antagonism. Anti-immigrant sentiments are fertilized by images of a victorious-enlightened West over an Islamic Ottoman Empire that stood at the *Gates of Europe* in 1683, and was beaten during the Siege of Vienna, though not for good.

These images are pumped up in politics and in the media as a real threat to Dutch shores, and are welcomed by those who rally against immigration. The threats trigger a call to arms defending an inflated Dutch national identity. Ironically the counterpart of the *True Dutch* persona is the *allochton*, his alter ego. The *allochton* carries a double burden, by his definition of not-being Dutch, and as a whipping boy for the *True Dutch* protagonist who feels excluded in his own way. The *allochton* serves as a scapegoat, exonerating Dutch politics for not having found an answer to the tidal changes at home and abroad. The *allochton* is overcharged, a persona with great populist appeal, and his *integration* is taken for a panacea.

## Annex Chapter 4

Table 1: *Allochton Speak - Amsterdam, 2009.*

Percentages of Amsterdam total population: 754.842.

	%	%	%
“Dutch” (Nederlander)	50.7		
Allochton	49.3		
Western		14.5	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation			7.7
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation			6.8
Non-Western		34.8	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation			19.9
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation			14.9

Table 2: *Immigrant Classification - Amsterdam, 2009.*

Percentages of Amsterdam total population: 754.842.

	%	%
“Dutch” (Nederlander)	72.4	
“True Dutch”		50.7
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Dutch		21.7
Immigrants	27.6	
Western		7.7
Non-Western		19.9

Table 3: *Allochton Speak - Rotterdam, 2009.*  
 Percentages of Rotterdam total population: 587.161

	%	%	%
“Dutch” (Nederlander)	53.1		
Allochton	46.9		
Western		10.5	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation			5.6
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation			4.9
Non-Western		36.4	
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation			20.9
2 <sup>nd</sup> Generation			15.5

Table 4: *Immigrant Classification - Rotterdam, 2009.*  
 Percentages of Rotterdam total population: 587.161.

	%	%
“Dutch” (Nederlander)	73.5	
‘True Dutch’		53.1
1 <sup>st</sup> Generation Dutch		20.4
Immigrants	26.5	
Western		5.6
Non-Western		20.9

